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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON,
Case No. 930437-CA

Appellant,
vs.

Priority No. 15

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON,
Appellee.
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this matter pursuant
to the provisions of §78-2a-3(2)(i), Utah Code Annotated, as
amended.
STATEMENT OP ISSUES
The following issues are presented for appeal:
Whether or not the trial court committed error in denying
Appellant's Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations
Order.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant filed a Complaint for divorce on or about April 24,
1992, to which the Appellee filed an Answer and Counterclaim.

On

October 8, 1992, Appellant appeared pro se before Howard H.
Maetani, Commissioner, for a default divorce proceeding based upon
the terms of a Stipulation between the parties which was actually
filed the following day, October 9, 1992. Neither Appellee nor her
counsel were present at the time of the default hearing.
1

On

October 9, 1992, Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, together
with a Decree of Divorce were presented to the Commissioner, signed
and entered.

On November 19, 1992, Appellant filed a document

entitled Motion for Change of Venue and a Property Settlement Trial
and a Request for Hearing (Addendum Exhibit 1) to which Appellee
filed a Response. Commissioner Maetani, after reviewing the matter
and having made findings, recommended that the motion of the
Appellant be denied.

In the written Opinion of the Commissioner

dated December 7, 1992, he specifically stated that the parties had
ten (10) days to file specific written objections to his ruling
with the clerk of the court.
Appellant then filed a document entitled Motion for Property
Settlement Trial on December 8, 1992, (Addendum Exhibit 2) and on
December 17, 1992, filed an Objection to Ruling (Addendum, Exhibit
3).

On January 12, 1993, the Appellant filed a document entitled

Motion to Correct and Amend the Decree of Divorce to Conform to the
Law (Addendum, Exhibit 4).

On January 13, 1993, District Judge Ray

M. Harding entered an Order which upheld the recommendations and
ruling of the Commissioner and denied Appellant's Motion for Change
of Venue as inappropriate.
The Appellant next filed a document entitled Objection to
Order and Request for Hearing on January 27, 1993, (Addendum,
Exhibit 5). Judge Harding again considered the matter and again
denied Appellant's motion on February 9, 1993.
On or about March 22, 1993, Appellant filed another motion
entitled Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations Order
2

(Addendum, Exhibit 6), then on May 3, 1993, the Appellant filed a
document

entitled

Relations Order

Request

for

a

Hearing

(Addendum, Exhibit 7) .

Qualified

Domestic

Judge Harding, while

indicating that he was not certain as to what the Appellant
intended by the request, treated them as motions for relief from
the Stipulation and Decree. The Court found that the requests did
not raise any additional issues which had not previously been ruled
upon by the Court and therefore denied the requests of Appellant.
It is that denial on which the Appellant takes this appeal.
SUMMARY OP ARGUMENTS
Appellant's appeal should be dismissed as the issues raised
concerning the original Decree are not timely.
Commissioner Maetani had the statutory authority to enter a
Decree upon a Stipulation in a default hearing (especially where
the moving party was the Appellant) based upon the provisions of
Rule 6-401, Utah Code of Judicial Administration.
The lower court's denials of the various motions of the
Appellant for relief from the Decree of Divorce were correct.
The remainder of issues raised by the Appellant are without
merit.
The Appellant should be required to pay Appellee's attorneys
fees and costs of this appeal.
ARGUMENTS
POINT I
APPELLANT'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED AS IT IS NOT TIMELY.
As set forth in the facts recited above, the Appellant in this
3

case signed a Stipulation dated October 7, 1992, which dealt with
the issues of the marriage. The Appellant then appeared before the
Divorce Commissioner on October 8, 1992, and represented that the
matter had been resolved by Stipulation of the parties.

The

Appellant was the only person who appeared before the Commissioner
and gave grounds for the divorce. The Decree of Divorce was signed
on the 9th day of October, 1992.

The Appellant did not file any

documents objecting to the Decree or Stipulation until November 19,
1992.

Even giving the Appellant the benefit of the doubt and

treating his Motion for Property Settlement Trial and Motion for
Change of Venue as a motion for a new trial, said motion was not
filed timely. A motion for new trial under Rule 59, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure, must be filed within ten (10) days of the entry of
judgment. The motions of the Appellant were nonetheless considered
by the Commissioner and denied. The objection of the Appellant was
filed and the issue was considered by the District Court, Judge Ray
M. Harding, who also denied the motions on the 13th of January,
1993.
At that time, treating the requests of the Appellant for trial
as a motion for new trial, Appellant would have 30 days from the
13th of January, 1993, to appeal the Decree of Divorce. No appeal
was filed.
The Appellant filed a similar set of motions, which Judge
Harding considered and denied on February 9, 1993. Again, giving
the Appellant

the benefit of the doubt and considering the

additional motions as requests for relief from the Decree under the
4

provisions of Rule 60(b)(3), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, he
would have 90 days from which to appeal the denial of said motions
for relief.

Appellant never did file an appeal

from Judge

Harding's ruling. Therefore, this appeal is not timely. Appellant
cannot stretch his time to appeal by refiling motions on the same
issues as he has done in this case.

See Burgers v. Maiben, 652

P.2d 1320 (Utah 1982).
POINT II
COMMISSIONER MAETANI HAD THE STATUTORY AUTHORITY TO ENTER THE
DECREE IN THIS CASE, AS THE MATTER WAS A DEFAULT AND COMES WITHIN
THE AUTHORITY GRANTED BY RULE 6-401 OF THE UTAH CODE OF JUDICIAL
ADMINISTRATION.
The Decree entered in this matter was properly within the
authority of the Commissioner. As stated above, the matter was set
as a default matter upon the stipulation of the parties and at the
request of Appellant.

The Decree entered was in accordance with

the terms of the Stipulation of the parties.
Utah

Code

authority

of
of

Judicial
the

Administration,

Commissioner

to

Rule 6-401(2)(G) ,

specifically

"Adjudicate

provides

default

and

uncontested divorces and uncontested modifications."
Appellant cites Holm v. Smilowitz, 840 P.2d 157 (Utah App.
1992) as authority for the proposition that the Commissioner in
this case did not have the authority to act in the matter.
However, that case specifically recognizes the authority of the
Commissioner under Rule 6-401 to enter default decrees as was done
in this case.
The Decree of Divorce in this case has been validly entered
and the provisions of such should be binding upon the parties.
5

POINT III
THE LOWER COURT" S DENIAL OF THE VARIOUS MOTIONS OF THE APPELLANT
FOR RELIEF FROM THE DECREE WAS CORRECT.
Appellant's argument that the Commissioner

acted without

authority in denying him an evidentiary hearing on the issues
raised by his various motions for trial and change of venue is also
without merit. Appellant cites Holm, supra., as authority for this
contention. However, in the present case, the Commissioner did not
enter a final order, but merely made recommendations to which the
Appellant objected,

following which, after consideration, the

District Judge, denied Appellant's requests. This procedure is the
procedure which is contemplated by Holm. As stated at 840 P.2d at
167:
Rule 6-401 grants commissioners the authority and duty to,
among other things, conduct hearing with parties and their
counsel, and to make recommendations to the parties and the
court regarding any issue in domestic relations•
These
provisions are clearly constitutional, since ultimate decision
making remains with the judge.
In the present case, the Commissioner merely made recommendations
to the Court which Judge Harding ultimately considered and ruled
upon.

The February 9, 1993, ruling was the result of a direct

consideration

of the Appellant's contention by Judge Harding

without input or consideration of the Commissioner at all.
Further, the Court correctly ruled in holding the Appellant to
the terms of the Decree where the Decree was based upon the
Stipulation of the parties.

Despite numerous assertions in the

Stipulation entered into by the parties to the effect that the
Appellant "specifically states that he is free of coercion, and
6

that no one is forcing him to give his approval to these terms;11
that he felt the terms were reasonable and fair; that was under no
obligation to enter into the Stipulation; the Appellant alleged
that he was not bound.
Commissioner

on the

In court he was also questioned by the

record

concerning

his understanding

and

acceptance of the terms of the Stipulation without an indication
from Appellant that he was at all hesitant or concerned about any
of the terms. Under Maxwell v. Maxwell, 796 P.2d 403 (1990), the
Appellant is bound unless he can show good cause. In this case the
good cause suggested by the Appellant consists of complaints that
the judicial system is gender biased which resulted in unfairness
in the treatment of the Appellant.

That allegation does not

explain why the Appellant would agree to terms which he later
claimed to be unfair.

His complaint does not seem to be centered

upon any claim that the Decree does not reflect the terms of the
Stipulation, only that what he once agreed to is now unfair.

His

present "seller's remorse" does not constitute good cause for which
the agreement of the parties should now be abrogated.
POINT IV
THE REMAINDER OP APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS ARE WITHOUT MERIT.
Appellant raises additional arguments, such as requests that
the appellate court make orders dividing the property, retirement
and other requests which are not appropriate actions for an
appellate court to take with the case in its present posture.
Accordingly, Appellee does not respond to those additional issues.

7

POINT V
THE APPELLANT SHOULD BE REQUIRED TO PAY APPELLEE'S ATTORNEY'S
FEES AND COSTS FOR THIS APPEAL.
Pursuant to Rule 33(a), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure# the
Appellant should be required to pay and the court should award
attorney's fees and costs to the Appellee in the event the Court
determines the appeal to be frivolous and without merit.

In this

matter, the record is clear that the Appellant has continually
filed frivolous motions to which the Appellee has been required to
respond.

This action includes the appeal.

Appellant has not

raised any issues of merit in this appeal and the brief submitted
is

replete

with

inappropriate

juvenile

rantings

condemning

Appellee's counsel, the Court, and the judicial system.
CONCLUSION
Appellant's appeal in this matter should be denied and the
decision of the lower court upheld. Appellee should be awarded her
costs of appeal including a reasonable attorney's fee in this
matter.
DATED this 2nd day of February, 1994.
ALDRICH, NELSON, WEIGHT & ESPLIN

MICHAEJ/D. ESPLIN'
Attorney for Appellee
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I mailed, postage prepaid, this 2nd day
of February, 1994, two copies of the foregoing Brief of Appellee to
the following:
Robert H. Peterson
Pro Se
500 South Main
PO Box 435
Springville, UT 84663
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ADDENDUM
Statutes
Utah Code Annotated, §78-2a-3(2)(i)
Utah Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 6-401
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 33(a)
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 59
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 60(b)(3)
Exhibits
Exhibit 1 - Motion for a Change of Venue and a Property Settlement
Trial and a Request for a Hearing
Exhibit 2 - Motion for a Property Settlement Trial
Exhibit 3 - Objection to the Ruling of the Court
Request for a Jury Trial
Exhibit 4 - Motion to Correct and Amend the Decree of Divorce to
Conform to the Law
Exhibit 5 - Objection to the Order and Request for a Hearing
Exhibit 6 - Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations
Order
Exhibit 7 - Request for a Hearing Qualified Domestic Relations
Order
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a successor is appointed and qualified. The presiding
judge of the Court of Appeals shall receive as additional compensation $1,000 per annum or fraction
thereof for the period served.
(2) The Court of Appeals shall sit and render judgment in panels of three judges. Assignment to panels
shall be by random rotation of all judges of the Court
of Appeals. The Court of Appeals by rule shall provide for the selection of a chair for each panel. The
Court of Appeals may not sit en banc.
(3) The judges of the Court of Appeals shall elect a
presiding judge from among the members of the court
by majority vote of all judges. The term of office of the
presiding judge is two years and until a successor is
elected. A presiding judge of the Court of Appeals
may serve in that office no more than two successive
terms. The Court of Appeals may by rule provide for
an acting presiding judge to serve in the absence or
incapacity of the presiding judge.
(4) The presiding judge may be removed from the
office of presiding judge by majority vote of all judges
of the Court of Appeals. In addition to the duties of a
judge of the Court of Appeals, the presiding judge
shall:
(a) administer the rotation and scheduling of
panels;
(b) act as liaison with the Supreme Court;
(c) call and preside over the meetings of the
Court of Appeals; and
(d) carry out duties prescribed by the Supreme
Court and the Judicial Council.
(5) Filing fees for t h e Court of Appeals are the
same a s for the Supreme Court.
1988
78-2a-3. Court of A p p e a l s jurisdiction.
(1) The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue
all extraordinary writs and to issue all writs and process necessary:
(a) to carry into effect its judgments, orders,
and decrees; or
(b) in aid of its jurisdiction.
(2) The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) the final orders and decrees resulting from
formal adjudicative proceedings of state agencies
or appeals from the district court review of informal adjudicative proceedings of the agencies, except the Public Service Commission, State Tax
Commission, Board of State Lands, Board of Oil,
Gas, and Mining, and the state engineer;
(b) appeals from the district court review of:
(i) adjudicative proceedings of agencies of
political subdivisions of the state or other local agencies; and
(ii) a challenge to agency action under
Section 63-46a-12.1;
(c) appeals from the juvenile courts;
(d) appeals from the circuit courts, except
those from the small claims department of a circuit court;
(e) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record in criminal cases, except those involving a
charge of a first degree or capital felony;
(f) appeals from a court of record in criminal
cases, except those involving a conviction of a
first degree or capital felony;
(g) appeals from orders on petitions for extraordinary writs sought by persons who are incarcerated or serving any other criminal sentence, except petitions constituting a challenge to
a conviction of or the sentence for a first degree
or capital felony;

(h) appeals from the orders on petitions for extraordinary writs challenging the decisions of the
Board of Pardons except in cases involving a first
degree or capital felony;
(i) appeals from district court involving domestic relations cases, including, but not limited to,
divorce, annulment, property division, child custody, support, visitation, adoption, and paternity;
(j) appeals from the Utah Military Court; and
(k) cases transferred to the Court of Appeals
from the Supreme Court.
(3) The Court of Appeals upon its own motion only
and by the vote of four judges of the court may certify
to the Supreme Court for original appellate review
and determination any matter over which the Court
of Appeals has original appellate jurisdiction.
(4) The Court of Appeals shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1992
78-2a-4. R e v i e w of actions b y S u p r e m e C o u r t
Review of the judgments, orders, and decrees of the
Court of Appeals shall be by petition for writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court.
1986
78-2a-5. L o c a t i o n of Court o f A p p e a l s .
The Court of Appeals h a s its principal location in
Salt Lake City. T h e Court of Appeals m a y perform
any of its functions in any location within the state.
1986

CHAPTER 3
DISTRICT COURTS
Section
78-3-1 to 78-3-2. Repealed.
Term of judges — Vacancy.
78-3-3.
78-3-4.
Jurisdiction — Transfer of cases to circuit court — Appeals — Jurisdiction
when circuit and district court
merged.
Repealed.
78-3-5.
Terms — Minimum of once quarterly.
78-3-6.
78-3-7 to 78-3-11. Repealed.
State District Court Administrative
78-3-11.5.
System.
78-3-12.
Repealed.
78-3-12.5.
Costs of system.
78-3-13.
Repealed.
78-3-13.4.
Counties joining court system — Procedure — Facilities — Salaries.
78-3-13.5, 78-3-14. Repealed.
78-3-14.5.
Allocation of district court fees and
fines.
78-3-15 to 78-3-17. Repealed.
78-3-17.5.
Application of savings accruing to
counties.
Judicial Administration Act — Short
78-3-18.
title.
Purpose of act.
78-3-19.
78-3-20.
Definitions.
78-3-21.
Judicial Council — Creation — Members — Terms and election — Responsibilities — Reports.
78-3-21.5.
Data bases for judicial boards.
78-3-22.
Presiding officer — Compensation —
Duties.
Administrator of the courts — Ap78-3-23.
pointment — Qualifications — Salary.
Court administrator — Powers, du78-3-24.
ties, and responsibilities.

Section
78-3-25.

As

78-3-26.

C(

78-3-27.
78-3-28.
78-3-29.

Ai
R<
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78-3-30.
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Applicability
This rule shall apply to the Council, the Administrative Office, the Board of District Court Judges and
the statutory panel
S t a t e m e n t of t h e R u l e :
(1) The presiding officer of the Council shall appoint a panel of five district court judges m accordance with Utah Code Ann Section 77-10a-2 to hear
information which may justify the calling of a grand
jury
(2) One judge shall be appointed from the first or
second district for a five year term, one judge shall be
appointed from the third district for a four year term,
one judge shall be appointed from the fourth district
for a three year term, one judge shall be appointed
from the fifth, sixth, seventh or eighth distnct for a
two year term, and one judge shall be appointed from
the third district for a one year term Following the
first term all terms on the panel are for five years
(3) As vacancies occur or terms expire on the
panel, the Board shall recommend to the presiding
officer of the Council a judge to fill the unexpired
portion of the term or to serve a new term
(4) The Court Administrator shall designate a staff
member to serve as secretariat to the panel and to
coordinate scheduling, budget and other administrative activities
(5) The Administrative Office, a t the direction of
the panel, shall annually publish a schedule which
provides for a panel hearing in each judicial distnct
every three years
(6) Thirty days prior to the hearing, the panel shall
give public notice of the hearing
(7) The panel shall develop necessary procedures
for its operation and shall publish such procedures as
an appendix to this Code
(Added effective April 15, 1991 )
A R T I C L E 4.
D O M E S T I C RELATIONS.
R u l e 6-401. Domestic relations c o m m i s s i o n e r s .
Intent:
To identify the types of cases and matters which
commissioners are authorized to hear, to identify the
types of relief which commissioners may recommend
and to identify the types of final orders which may be
issued by commissioners
To establish a procedure for judicial review of commissioners' decisions
Applicability
This rule shall govern all domestic relations court
commissioners serving in the District Courts
S t a t e m e n t of t h e R u l e :
(1) T y p e s of c a s e s a n d m a t t e r s . All domestic re
lations matters filed in the district court in counties
where court commissioners are appointed and serving including all divorce, annulment, paternity and
spouse abuse matters, orders to show cause, scheduling and settlement conferences, petitions to modify
di\orce decrees scheduling conferences, and all other
applications for relief, shall be referred to the com
missioner upon filing with the clerk of the court un
less otherwise ordered by the Presiding Judge of the
District
(2) A u t h o r i t y of C o u r t C o m m i s s i o n e r . Court
commissioners shall have the following authority
(A) Upon notice require the personal appearance of parties and their counsel,

(B) Require the filing of financial disclosure
statements and proposed settlement forms by the
parties,
(C) Obtain child custody evaluations from t h e
Division of Family Services pursuant to U t a h
Code Ann Section 62A-4-106, or through the private sector,
(D) Make recommendations to the court regarding any issue in domestic relations or spouse
abuse cases at any stage of the proceedings,
(E) Require counsel to file with the initial or
responsive pleading, a certificate based upon the
facts available at that time, stating whether
there is a legal action pending or previously adju
dicated in a district or juvenile court of any s t a t e
regarding the minor child(ren) in the c u r r e n t
case,
(F) At the commissioner's discretion, and after
notice to all parties or their counsel, conduct evidentiary hearings consistent with paragraph
(3KC) below,
(G) Adjudicate default and uncontested divorces and uncontested modifications,
(H) Enter a default judgment or impose sanctions against any party who fails to comply with
the commissioner's requirements of attendance
or production of discovery,
(I) Impose sanctions against any person who
acts contemptuously under Utah Code Ann Section 78-32-10,
(J) Issue temporary or ex parte orders,
(K) Conduct settlement conferences with the
parties and their counsel for the purpose of facilitating settlement of any or all issues in a domestic relations case Issues which cannot be agreed
upon by the parties at the settlement conference
shall be certified to the district court for trial,
and
(L) Conduct pretrial conferences with t h e parties and their counsel on all domestic relations
matters unless otherwise ordered by the presiding judge The commissioner shall make recommendations on all issues under consideration a t
the pretrial and submit those recommendations
to the district court
(3) D u t i e s of C o u r t C o m m i s s i o n e r . Under the
general supervision of the presiding judge, the court
commissioner has the following duties prior to a n y
domestic matter being heard by the district court
(A) Review all pleadings in each case,
(B) Certify those cases directly to the district
court that appear to require a hearing before the
district court judge,
(C) Except in cases previously certified to t h e
district court, conduct hearings with parties and
their counsel for the purpose of submitting recommendations to the parties and the court,
(D) Coordinate information with the juvenile
court regarding previous or pending proceedings
involving children of the parties, and
(E) Refer appropriate cases to mediation programs if available
(4) O b j e c t i o n s . With the exception of pre trial orders, the commissioner's recommendation is t h e order
of the court until modified by the court Any party
objecting to the recommended order, shall file a written objection to the recommendation with the clerk of
the court and serve copies on the commissioner's office and opposing counsel Objections shall be filed
within ten days of the date the recommendation was
made in open court or if taken under advisement, ten
days after the date of the subsequent written recom-

mendation made by the commissioner. Objections
shall be to specific recommendations and shall set
forth reasons for each objection.
(5) Judicial review. Cases not resolved at the settlement or pretrial conference shall be set for trial on
all issues not resolved. All other matters shall be reviewed in accordance with Rule 4-501.
(6) Prohibitions.
(A) Commissioners shall not make final adjudications of domestic relations matters other
than default or uncontested divorces and modifications.
(B) Commissioners shall not serve as pro tempore judges in any matter, except as provided by
Rule of the Supreme Court.
(Amended effective January 15, 1990; April 15,
1991.)
Rule 6-402. Repealed.
Rule 6-403. Shortening 90-day waiting period in
domestic matters.
Intent:
To establish a procedure for shortening or waiving
the 90-day waiting period in domestic cases.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to the district courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Proceedings on the merits of a divorce action
shall not be heard by the district courts unless 90
days have elapsed from the time the complaint was
filed or unless the Court finds that there is good cause
for shortening or eliminating the waiting period and
enters a formal order to that effect prior to the hearing date.
(2) Application for a hearing less than 90 days
from the date the complaint was filed shall be made
by motion and accompanied by an affidavit setting
forth the factual matters constituting good cause. The
motion and supporting affidavit(s) shall be served on
the opposing party at least five days prior to the
scheduled hearing unless the party is in default.
(3) In the event the Court finds that there is good
cause for hearing in less than 90 days from the filing
of the complaint, the facts constituting such cause
shall be included in the findings of fact and presented
to the Court for signature.
Rule 6-404. Modification of divorce decrees.
Intent:
To establish procedures for modification of existing
divorce decrees.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all district courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) Proceedings to modify a divorce decree shall be
commenced by the filing of a petition to modify in the
original divorce action. Service of the petition and
summons upon the opposing party shall be in accordance with the requirements of Rule 4 of the Utah
Rules of Civil Procedure. No request for a modification of an existing decree shall be raised by way of an
order to show cause.
(2) The responding party shall serve the reply
within twenty days after service of the petition. Either party may file a certificate of readiness for trial.
Upon filing of the certificate, the matter shall be referred to the domestic relations commissioner prior to
trial, or in those districts where there is not a domestic relations commissioner, placed on the trial calendar.
(3) No petition for modification shall be placed on a
law and motion or order to show cause calendar with-

out the consent of the commissioner or the district
judge.
Rule 6-405. Repealed.
Rule 6-406. Opening sealed adoption files.
Intent:
To establish uniform procedures for opening sealed
adoption files and providing identifying information
to adoptees and/or birth parents.
Applicability:
This rule shall apply to all district and juvenile
courts.
Statement of the Rule:
(1) All requests to open sealed adoption files to obtain identifying information of adoptee or birth parents shall be initiated by filing a formal petition with
the clerk of the court in the county where the adoption was granted. The petition must set forth in detail
the reasons the information is desired and must be
accompanied by a filing fee of $75.00. Neither a formal petition nor a filing fee is required to obtain certified copies of the decree.
(2) In cases where the petitioner is seeking specific
medical information to aid in the preservation of the
health of the petitioner, the petitioner must contact
the Bureau of Vital Statistics and the adoption
agency involved in the placement (if applicable) and
make a request for all non-identifying information
regarding the birth parents and other relatives. The
petition must be accompanied by a letter from a licensed physician stating what the need is and
whether the information is necessary for the preservation of the health of the petitioner.
(3) In cases where the petitioner is requesting the
information for reasons other than to acquire specific
medical data needed to aid in the preservation of the
health of the petitioner, the petitioner must register
with the Voluntary Adoption Registry established by
the Bureau of Vital Statistics in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. Section 78-30-18.
(4) Upon receipt of the petition, filing fee, and supporting documents, the court may set the matter for
hearing. Petitioner shall give notice of the hearing
date and time to the placement agency or the attorney who handled the private placement. The notice
shall advise the placement agency or the attorney of
the petition and request their attendance at the hearing or their written response to the petition.
(5) After a hearing, the court shall make specific
findings of fact that good cause exists and that the
adoption records shall be opened to petitioner. The
findings shall address such issues as whether the
birth parents should be notified of the petition and
given the opportunity to respond, and if it is not possible to contact the birth parents, why the adoptee's
need to know overrides the duty of confidentiality
owed to the birth parents.
(6) Upon a finding of good cause to open to the
adoption records, the court shall specify which
records or portions of records the petitioner may have
access to. The court should be sensitive to the fact
that some of the records may not be appropriate for
release to the adoptee, including agency notes regarding the personal observations of the birth parents and
the circumstances surrounding the birth, etc. The
court shall carefully consider what effect the release
of such information would have on the parties involved and may restrict access to such information in
the court records as well as the records of the adoption agency.
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tice or judge concurring or dissenting may likewise
give reasons in writing and file the same with the
clerk. The entry by the clerk in the records of the
court shall constitute the entry of the judgment of the
court.
(d) Decision without opinion. If, after oral argument, the court concludes that a case satisfies the
criteria set forth in Rule 31(b), it may dispose of the
case by order without written opinion. The decision
shall have only such effect as precedent as is provided
for by Rule 31(f).
(e) Notice of decision. Immediately upon the
entry of the decision, the clerk shall give notice to the
respective parties and make the decision public in
accordance with the direction of the court.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 31. Expedited appeals decided after oral
argument without written opinion.
(a) Motion and stipulation for expedited hearing. After the filing of ail briefs in an appeal, a party
may move for an expedited decision without a written
opinion. The motion shall be in the form prescribed
by Rule 23 and shall describe the nature of the case,
the issues presented and any special reasons the parties may have for an expedited decision. The court
may dispose of any qualified case under this rule
upon its own motion before or after oral argument.
(b) Cases which qualify for expedited decision.
The following are matters which the court may consider for expedited decision without opinion:
(1) appeals involving uncomplicated factual issues based primarily on documents;
(2) summary judgments;
(3) dismissals for failure to state a claim;
(4) dismissals for lack of personal or subject
matter jurisdiction; and
(5) judgments or orders based on uncomplicated issues of law.
(c) In all motions brought under this rule, the substantive rules of law should be deemed settled, although the parties may differ as to their application.
(d) Appeals ineligible for expedited decision.
The court will not grant a motion for an expedited
appeal in cases raising substantial constitutional issues, issues of significant public interest, issues of
law of first impression, or complicated issues of fact or
law.
(e) Procedure if expedited motion is granted. If
a motion for expedited decision is granted, the appeal
will be given an expedited setting for oral argument
within 45 to 60 days from the date of the order granting the motion. Within two days after submission of
the appeal, the court will conference, decide the case,
and issue a written order which need not be accompanied by an opinion. Entry of the order by the clerk in
the records of the court, shall constitute the entry of
the judgment of the court.
(f) Effect as precedent Appeals decided under
this rule will not stand as precedent, but, in other
respects, will have the same force and effect as other
decisions of the court.
(g) Issuance of written opinion. If it appears to
the court after the case has been submitted for decision that a written opinion should be issued, the time
limitation in paragraph (e) shall not apply and the
parties will be so notified.
(Amended effective October 1, 1992.)
Rule 32. Interest on judgment.
Unless otherwise provided by law, if a judgment for
money in a civil case is affirmed, whatever interest is

allowed by law shall be payable from the date the
judgment was entered in the trial court.
Rule 33. Damages for delay or frivolous appeal;
recovery of attorney's fees.
(a) Damages for delay or frivolous appeal. Except in a first appeal of right in a criminal case, if the
court determines that a motion made or appeal taken
under these rules is either frivolous or for delay, it
shall award just damages, which may include single
or double costs, as defined in Rule 34, and/or reasonable attorney fees, to the prevailing party. The court
may order that the damages be paid by the party or
by the party's attorney.
(b) Definitions. For the purposes of these rules, a
frivolous appeal, motion, brief, or other paper is one
that is not grounded in fact, not warranted by existing law, or not based on a good faith argument to
extend, modify, or reverse existing law. An appeal,
motion, brief, or other paper interposed for the purpose of delay is one interposed for any improper purpose such as to harass, cause needless increase in the
cost of litigation, or gain time that will benefit only
the party filing the appeal, motion, brief, or other
paper.
(c) Procedures.
(1) The court may award damages upon request of any party or upon its own motion. A
party may request damages under this rule only
as part of the appellee's motion for summary disposition under Rule 10, as part of the appellee's
brief, or as part of a party's response to a motion
or other paper.
(2) If the award of damages is upon the motion
of the court, the court shall issue to the party or
the party's attorney or both an order to show
cause why such damages should not be awarded.
The order to show cause shall set forth the allegations which form the basis of the damages and
permit at least ten days in which to respond unless otherwise ordered for good cause shown. The
order to show cause may be part of the notice of
oral argument.
(3) If requested by a party against whom damages may be awarded, the court shall grant a
hearing.
Rule 54. Award of costs.
(a) To whom allowed. Except as otherwise provided by law, if an appeal is dismissed, costs shall be
taxed Against the appellant unless otherwise agreed
by the parties or ordered by the court; if a judgment
or order is affirmed, costs shall be taxed against appellant unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or
order is reversed, costs shall be taxed against the appellee unless otherwise ordered; if a judgment or order is affirmed or reversed in part, or is vacated, costs
shall be allowed as ordered by the court. Costs shall
not be allowed or taxed in a criminal case.
(b) Costs for and against the state of Utah. In
cases involving the state of Utah or an agency or
officer thereof, an award of costs for or against the
state shall be at the discretion of the court unless
specifically required or prohibited by law.
(c) Costs of briefs and attachments, record,
bonds and other expenses on appeal. The following may be taxed as costs in favor of the prevailing
party in the appeal: the actual costs of a printed or
typewritten brief or memoranda and attachments not
to exceed $3.00 for each page; actual costs incurred in
the preparation and transmission of the record, including costs of the reporter's transcript unless other-

ploying them to pay to the other party the amount of
the reasonable expenses which the filing of the affidavits caused him to incur, including reasonable attorney's fees, and any offending party or attorney may
be adjudged guilty of contempt.
Rule 57. Declaratory judgments.
The procedure for obtaining a declaratory judgment pursuant to Chapter 33 of Title 78, U.C.A. 1953,
shall be in accordance with these rules, and the right
to trial by jury may be demanded under the circumstances and in the manner provided in Rules 38 and
39. The existence of another adequate remedy does
not preclude a judgment for declaratory relief in cases
where it is appropriate. The court may order a speedy
hearing of an action for a declaratory judgment and
may advance it on the calendar.
Rule 58A. Entry.
(a) Judgment upon the verdict of a jury. Unless
the court otherwise directs and subject to the provisions of Rule 54(b), judgment upon the verdict of a
jury shall be forthwith signed by the clerk and filed.
If there is a special verdict or a general verdict accompanied by answers to interrogatories returned by
a jury pursuant to Rule 49, the court shall direct the
appropriate judgment which shall be forthwith
signed by the clerk and filed.
(b) Judgment in other cases. Except as provided
in Subdivision (a) hereof and Subdivision (b)(1) of
Rule 55, all judgments shall be signed by the judge
and filed with the clerk.
(c) When judgment entered; notation in register of actions and judgment docket A judgment is
complete and shall be deemed entered for all purposes, except the creation of a lien on real property,
when the same is signed and filed as herein above
provided. The clerk shall immediately make a notation of the judgment in the register of actions and the
judgment docket.
(d) Notice of signing or entry of judgment. The
prevailing party shall promptly give notice of the
signing or entry of judgment to all other parties and
shall file proof of service of such notice with the clerk
of the court. However, the time for filing a notice of
appeal is not affected by the notice requirement of
this provision.
(e) Judgment after death of a party. If a party
dies after a verdict or decision upon any issue of fact
and before judgment, judgment may nevertheless be
rendered thereon.
(f) Judgment by confession. Whenever a judgment by confession is authorized by statute, the party
seeking the same must file with the clerk of the court
in which the judgment is to be entered a statement,
verified by the defendant, to the following effect:
(1) If the judgment to be confessed is for money
due or to become due, it shall concisely state the
claim and that the sum confessed therefor is
justly due or to become due;
(2) If the judgment to be confessed is for the
purpose of securing the plaintiff against a contingent liability, it must state concisely the claim
and that the sum confessed therefor does not exceed the same;
(3) It must authorize the entry of judgment for
a specified sum.
The clerk shall thereupon endorse upon the statement, and enter in the judgment docket, a judgment
of the court for the amount confessed, with costs of
entry, if any.
(Amended effective Sept. 4, 1985; Jan. 1, 1987.)

Rule 58B. Satisfaction of judgment.
(a) Satisfaction by owner or attorney. A judgment may be satisfied, in whole or in part, as to any
or all of the judgment debtors, by the owner thereof,
or by the attorney of record of the judgment creditor
where no assignment of the judgment has been filed
and such attorney executes such satisfaction within
eight years after the entry of the judgment, in the
following manner: (1) by written instrument, duly acknowledged by such owner or attorney; or (2) by acknowledgment of such satisfaction signed by the
owner or attorney and entered on the docket of the
judgment in the county where first docketed, with the
date affixed and witnessed by the clerk. Every satisfaction of a part of the judgment, or as to one or more
of the judgment debtors, shall state the amount paid
thereon or for the release of such debtors, naming
them.
(b) Satisfaction by order of court. When a judgment shall have been fully paid and not satisfied of
record, or when the satisfaction of judgment shall
have been lost, the court in which such judgment was
recovered may, upon motion and satisfactory proof,
authorize the attorney of the judgment creditor to
satisfy the same, or may enter an order declaring the
same satisfied and direct satisfaction to be entered
upon the docket.
(c) Entry by clerk. Upon receipt of a satisfaction
of judgment, duly executed and acknowledged, the
clerk shall file the same with the papers in the case,
and enter it on the register of actions. He shall also
enter a brief statement of the substance thereof, including the amount paid, on the margin of the judgment docket, with the date of filing of such satisfaction.
(d) Effect of satisfaction. When a judgment shall
have been satisfied, in whole or in part, or as to any
judgment debtor, and such satisfaction entered upon
the docket by the clerk, such judgment shall, to the
extent of such satisfaction, be discharged and cease to
be a lien. In case of partial satisfaction, if any execution shall thereafter be issued on the judgment, such
execution shall be endorsed with a memorandum of
such partial satisfaction and shall direct the officer to
collect only the residue thereof, or to collect only from
the judgment debtors remaining liable thereon.
(e) Filing transcript of satisfaction in other
counties. When any satisfaction of a judgment shall
have been entered on the judgment docket of the
county where such judgment was first docketed, a
certified transcript of satisfaction, or a certificate by
the clerk showing such satisfaction, may be filed with
the clerk of the district court in any other county
where the judgment may have been docketed. Thereupon a similar entry in the judgment docket shall be
made by the clerk of such court; and such entry shall
have the same effect as in the county where the same
was originally entered.
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment.
(a) Grounds. Subject to the provisions of Rule 61,
a new trial may be granted to all or any of the parties
and on all or part of the issues, for any of the following causes; provided, however, that on a motion for a
new trial in an action tried without a jury, the court
may open the judgment if one has been entered, take
additional testimony, amend findings of fact and conclusions of law or make new findings and conclusions,
and direct the entry of a new judgment:
(1) Irregularity in the proceedings of the court,
jury or adverse party, or any order of the court, or
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abuse of discretion by which either party was
prevented from having a fair trial.
(2) Misconduct of the jury; and whenever any
one or more of the jurors have been induced to
assent to any general or special verdict, or to a
finding on any question submitted to them by the
court, by resort to a determination by chance or
as a result of bribery, such misconduct may be
proved by the affidavit of any one of the jurors.
(3) Accident or surprise, which ordinary prudence could not have guarded against.
(4) Newly discovered evidence, material for
the party making the application, which he couid
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered
and produced a t the trial.
(5) Excessive or inadequate damages, appearing to have been given under the influence of
passion or prejudice.
(6) Insufficiency of the evidence to justify the
verdict or other decision, or that it is against law.
(7) Error in law.
(b) T i m e for m o t i o n . A motion for a new trial
shall be served not later than 10 days after the entry
of the judgment.
(c) Affidavits; t i m e for filing. When the application for a new trial is made under Subdivision (a)(1),
(2), (3), or (4), it shall be supported by affidavit.
Whenever a motion for a new trial is based upon affidavits they shall be served with the motion. The opposing party has 10 days afler such service within
which to serve opposing affidavits. The time within
which the affidavits or opposing affidavits shall be
served may be extended for an additional period not
exceeding 20 days either by the court for good cause
shown or by the parties by written stipulation. The
court may permit reply affidavits.
(d) O n initiative of court. Not later than 10 days
after entry of judgment the court of its own initiative
may order a new trial for any reason for which it
might have granted a new trial on motion of a party,
and in the order shall specify the grounds therefor.
(e) Motion t o alter o r amend a j u d g m e n t A motion to alter or amend the judgment shall be served
not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment.
Rule 60. Relief from j u d g m e n t o r o r d e r .
(a) Clerical m i s t a k e s . Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders or other parts of the record and errors
therein arising from oversight or omission may be
corrected by the court a t any time of its own initiative
or on the motion of any party and after such notice, if
any, as the court orders. During the pendency of an
appeal, such mistakes may be so corrected before the
appeal is docketed in the appellate court, and thereafter while the appeal is pending may be so corrected
with leave of the appellate court.
(b) M i s t a k e s ; i n a d v e r t e n c e ; e x c u s a b l e neglect;
newly d i s c o v e r e d e v i d e n c e ; f r a u d , e t c . On motion
at\d upon such terms a s are 3ust, Vhe court may \u lhs>
furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have
been discovered in time to move for a new trial under
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or
other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) when, for
any cause, the summons in an action has not been
personally served upon the defendant as required by
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear in
said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the judgment
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has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior
judgment upon which it is based has been reversed or
otherwise vacated, or it is no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application; or
(7) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The motion shall be made
within a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3),
or (4), not more than 3 months after the judgment,
order, or proceeding was entered or taken. A motion
under this Subdivision (b) does not affect the finality
of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does
not limit the power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from a judgment, order
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for fraud
upon the court. The procedure for obtaining any relief
from a judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in
these rules or by an independent action.
Kule 61. H a r m l e s s e r r o r .
No error in either the admission or the exclusion of
evidence, and no error or defect in any ruling or order
or in anything done or omitted by the court or by any
of the parties, is ground for granting a new trial or
otherwise disturbing a judgment or order, unless refusal to take such action appears to the court inconsistent with substantial justice. The court a t every
Stage of the proceeding must disregard any error or
defect in the proceeding which does not affect the substantial rights of the parties.
Rule 62. Stay of p r o c e e d i n g s to e n f o r c e a j u d g ment.
(a> Stay u p o n e n t r y of j u d g m e n t Execution or
other proceedings to enforce a judgment may issue
immediately upon the entry of the judgment, unless
the court in its discretion and on such conditions for
the security of the adverse party as are proper, otherwise directs.
(b) Stay on motion for n e w trial o r for j u d g m e n t In its discretion and on such conditions for the
security of the adverse party as are proper, the court
may stay the execution of, or any proceedings to enforce, a judgment pending the disposition of a motion
for a new trial or to alter or amend a judgment made
pursuant to Rule 59, or of a motion for relief from a
judgment or order made pursuant to Rule 60, or of a
motion for judgment in accordance with a motion for
a directed verdict made pursuant to Rule 50, or of a
motion for amendment to the findings or for additional findings made pursuant to Rule 52(b).
( a Injunction p e n d i n g a p p e a l . When an appeal
is taken from an interlocutory or final judgment
granting, dissolving, or denying an injunction, the
court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore,
or grant an injunction during the pendency of the
appeal upon such conditions as it considers proper for
the security of the rights of the adverse party.
(d) Stay u p o n a p p e a l . When an appeal is taken
the appellant by giving a supersedeas bond may obtain a stay, unless such a stay is otherwise prohibited
by law or these rules. The bond may be given at or
after the tune of filing the notice of appeal. The stay
is effective when the supersedeas bond is approved by
the court.
(e' Stay in favor of the s t a t e , o r a g e n c y thereof.
When an appeal is taken by the United States, the
state oi Utah, or an officer or agency of either, or by
direction of any department of either, and the operation or enforcement of the judgment is stayed, no
bond, obligation, or other security shall be required
from the appellant.

Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
500 South Main P.O. Box 435
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff

:
:
:
:
:
:

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant

MOTION FOR A CHANGE OF
VENUE AND A PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT TRIAL
AND A REQUEST FOR A
HEARING
Judge Harding
Civil No. 924400839

Comes now the Plaintiff declaring the signature on all
Divorce documents, and on the document setting up the conditions of
the interim period, signed by the Plaintiff, were obtained by lies,
fraud and coercion and financial hardship. The bias of this Court
for the Defendant and her Counsel, and against any person acting
pro se, amounts to coercion on the part of the Court. The Court
has allowed the Counsel to fill in words, in statements made by the
Court, and thus mold the thinking of the Court. The golden rule of
this Court is; to denie each and every request by the person acting
pro se, no matter how benign that request might be. The Court has
systematically denied the Plaintiff's request to review the
atrocious conditions imposed by this Court of inequity. By this
Court, an order has been issued to grant to the Defendant an income
of $992.5/month from pager-voice-mail leases, $400/month from the
Four-Plex, $88/month interest, $140/month from a sale, $200/month
from student rental and to garnish half of the Plaintiff's $1,800
a month income.

EXHIBIT 1

2.

This was granted to the Defendant for a total sitting-on-her-

professional-fanny income of $2,580.50 per month. The Defendants
expenses, without a mortgage payment were about $580/ month. Thus
this Court has ordered that the Defendant should have $2,000 per
month to squirrel away in her secret bank accounts each month, in
keeping with the past 3 2 years. Thus the court would have her gain
$2,000 each month of the estate and denie the Plaintiff enough of
his earnings to live on. Thus by order of the Court she would have
$14,000 in the secret account over the seven months of trial. The
Plaintiff, by this Court's order was granted, $900/month of his
wages and thus has been denied the right to counsel by the Courtfs
own order. The right to Counsel is a basic God-given-constitutional
right denied by the Court through the above atrocity. The income
($900) granted by this Court of inequity, could not support the
Plaintiff's need for food, clothing and shelter, thus there was no
opportunity for the Plaintiff to have Counsel. By order of the
Court the Defendant has had the most expensive counsel available,
with the very best delay tactics, in the Country, paid for by the
Plaintiff each month. The Plaintiff requested a trial date on
Aug.6, 1992. The Defendant had no intention of bringing this matter
to trial with a Court ordered $2,000/month advantage.
3.

The Court has totally ignored the law in this case, by

granting the Defendant control over all of the assets of the estate
and requiring no accountability to the Plaintiff. The Court has
violated the purpose and the spirit of this law. The law clearly
states that the property shall be divided in half, and provides no
2

provision for one party to have complete control on a temporary, or
a permanent basis. In addition to the above atrocity the Defendant
paid nothing for the home she occupied. She was to obtain this from
the savings of the Plaintiff at a later date, and did exactly that.
Thus the income for the Defendant was $2,580.50 plus a mortgage
payment of $53 0 or $3,110.5 per month. What possible incentive
would the Defendant have to settle? If the Defendant had gone to
work at her profession, she would have had over $4,000/month coming
in. She is a professional teacher with a college degree and over 10
years of teaching experience. No court of equity would grant
temporary or permanent alimony in this case. I would like to be
shown a case where a professional person of this caliber has
received alimony from her exact counter part. This can happen only
in this Court, a Court of extreme bias.
4.

She paid nothing for seven months toward the mortgage of the

home she lives in, with the Courts approval. She had access to her
undeclared estate, and monies stolen from the marriage, and was
never required to account for these funds. ALL motions to the Court
concerning accountability have been systematically ignored or
denied. It is clear that the Court did not intend accountability
since the Court refuses to require the Defendant to show where the
$7,000 that was taken from the joint accounts was spent. The Court
has willfully allowed the Defendant to take money from the accounts
frozen by the Court, and place those funds in accounts, not frozen
by the Court. This Court of inequity, has frozen all of the
accounts of the Plaintiff. The Defendants Counsel selected which
3

accounts were to be frozen and the Plaintiff was denied any change
in that one sided policy.
5.

During the interim period the Plaintiff wrote up several

divisions of the property in the first and second person, and gave
the Defendant the opportunity to choose any party, of any split.
She, at the advice of counsel, declined any such offer. The
Plaintiff set up a meeting with an arbitrator(CPA) of the
Defendants choice. She never showed up. Her Counsel knew of the
bias of the Court and thus steered her clear of anything that
wouldn't give her the total; or very near, the total of the estate.
Counsel was aware of the bias of the Court from past experience.
6.

The bias of the Court was very clear when the Plaintiff ask

the Court to grant a divorce, and have a property settlement on the
2nd of December. This was a request that would not have made one
cent difference in the outcome of the trial. This was denied
without hearing any arguments for or against. The Counsel for the
Defendant filled in the Courts words "the Plaintiff needs more
incentive to settle." This message from the Court was very clear;
SIGN EVERYTHING YOU HAVE, OVER TO THE DEFENDANT, OR I WILL.
Rather than to go through the mockery of a trial, I have
signed a document doing just that. My only hope for equity, is an
appeal to another Court.
Dated this day the 7th day of October 1992.

Robert H. Peterson (Plaintiff)

Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
BOX 435
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant
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TRIAL
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:
:

Civil No. 924400839

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
1.

Comes now, the Plaintiff having been coerced into signing a

documents pertaining to the divorce of the above parties, requests
a trial for the purpose of granting the Plaintiff an opportunity to
be represented by counsel in an unbiased court of law and to have
that portion of the estate that the law decrees is his, granted to
him.
2.

The divorce as it now stands is a farce. Since no

accountability was required by the Court and none is written into
the divorce, there could be any amount of money, in any of the bank
accounts granted to the Defendant. No accurate appraisal was made
of the property. The appraisals were done by the Defendants brother
and do not reflect the true value of the property held by the
Defendant. None of the estate owned by the Defendant was ever
revealed to the Court or the Plaintiff. She was never required to
state where her Utah State retirement was or the amount held. She

EXHIBIT 2

was never required to show where the family investments were or the
amount accrued. If she claimed these moneys to be inherited the
Court required no proof of inherited money, so family investments
were designated by the Defendant as inherited, and were not
considered in the proceedings. She was free to move money in and
out of the accounts, while the Plaintiff was ordered not to touch
any of his personal savings. Fourteen thousand dollars of the
Plaintiffs personal savings were given to the Defendant prior to
the Divorce to pay the outstanding bills on the home. None of these
bills have been paid except the amount given to counsel for the
Defendant obtained by fraud. This money has been tucked away as all
other funds have been for the past 32 years of marriage.
3,

A verbal agreement, as reflected in the divorce, was that each

party was to pay his or her own attorneys fees. A few days prior to
the marriage of the Plaintiff counsel for the Defendant added a
$2,000 attorney fee to be paid to her as though it was in the cost
of redeeming the home. She was hoping that since the Plaintiff had
no counsel and could not afford it, he would not see this addition.
The Plaintiff stated clearly, directly, to Marilyn Brown, counsel
for the Defendant, that he was being coerced into signing this
agreement. She knew the Plaintiff had no counsel in this matter and
she knew that because of the pending marriage of the Plaintiff that
he would sign anything to be rid of the hate, in his life and marry
someone that truly loves him. Seven months of two to four hours of
sleep ,living in abject poverty, loosing ones health, and the
ability to perform on the job, and the pending marriage put the
2

Plaintiff in a very susceptible position.
4.

Thus the counsel for the Defendant entrapped the Plaintiff by

having him sign something she new was a farce but something she
thought would hold up in Court,
5.

Thus, each time the Plaintiff came to sign the documents new

paragraphs were added with no discussion.
6.

The bias of the Court did not require accountability. The

Court rubber stamped all documents submitted by Counsel for the
Defendant with out examination. There is no lease with the amount
$398/ month as stated, there is only a lease for $700/ month and
two others in the Plaintiffs name for a total of $195/ month and
one in the Defendants name at $97.5/month. This is another attempt
on the part of the Defendant's counsel to defraud the Plaintiff and
to keep the accured amounts in each account belonging to the
Plaintiff. No attempt has been made to pay any of these funds due
or abide in any way by the unjust terms of this atrocity.
7.

If the Court had required the Defendant to account for the

funds stolen from frozen accounts this would have revealed the
atrocity of the settlement. Any such accountability would have
shown this settlement in clear violation of the law and equity.
It is not equitable that the Defendant have half of the Plaintiff's
retirement and the income from the Four-Plex. The Divorce as it now
stands, grants the idler double the retirement of the worker. The
Defendant made no payments from her income for the home, or the
Four-Plex, or the retirement of the Plaintiff. All of the
Defendants income and much of the family investments, were tucked
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away in her accounts and labled inheritance, never to be used
except for separate vacations and items that benefited her only.
8.

She has contributed little or nothing in terms of labor to

maintain these properties. Why then would a Court of equity grant
to her all of these assets? The only answer is, that the Court
bought the "poor-housewife-act", that she is so good at. It is not
lawful or fair that all of the property and all of the good
investments of the marriage, amounting to hundreds of thousands of
dollars, be granted to Defendant and the near worthless
investments, amounting to a few thousand dollars be granted to the
Plaintiff.
9.

The Defendant was angry at the Plaintiff for slamming the door

at 8:00 AM, on his way to work and waking her. She often complained
the apartments or the home needed repair, that the lawn needed to
be mowed, or the garden weeded, since the work of maintenance was
assigned to the Plaintiff by the Defendant. As might be expected
she collected the rent.
10.

To let this atrocity stand, would confirm, that there is no

equity in the Courts. We have lost our right to a trial by a jury
of our peers in the divorce court, the tax court, in foreclosure
and is rarely granted in any other court. If this divorce stands ,
then we can say, the constitutional right to counsel has also been
lost. Our courts are nothing but a big business, designed to delay,
intimidate, agitate and avoid the issue until the lawyers have most
of the property in question.
Dated this day December 8, 1992. .
The P l a i n t i f f
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Robert H. P e t e r s o n

D u b . . • J : v> o «-

Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
500 South Main
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff

THE
OBJECTION
TO
RULING OF THE
COURT
REQUEST FOR A JURY
TRIAL
COMMISSIONER MAETANI
Civil No, 924400839

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant

Comes now the Plaintiff objects to the ruling of the Court
since none of the items raised by the Plaintiff were addressed in
the Ruling. The question of representation for the Plaintiff was
not considered by the Court, The question of equity according to
the law has not been considered by the Court. The Court has not
considered the question of accountability according to the law.
The history of this endless case, and as long as there is no
trail it will be endless, as outlined by the Court reinforces the
rubber stamping of all matters brought before the Court by the
Defendant's counsel and consistently ignoring

all matters brought

before the Court by the Plaintiff, no matter how insignificant the
item may be. It should be noted that the Court in it's total bias
in this matter denied the Plaintiff's request for a ruling on the
bases of some violation of procedure, but was very prompt to
respond the Defendants request without input from the Plaintiff or
without the benefit of a hearing.

EXHIBIT 3

The Court in it's bias has denied the Plaintiff his
constitutional right to a hearing on all matters before the Court.
The Court would not want the counsel for the Defendant to testify
, and set in the record, the fact that before signing any documents
the Plaintiff said verbally to that "counsel" on two occasions that
he was being coerced. The Court did note correctly that the
Plaintiff did sign the Request for a Hearing and the Stipulation on
the same day so that there could be NO question the Plaintiff was
being coerced. It is very important that the Court recognize that
both written and verbal testimony exits that the Plaintiff was
coerced.
The history of this matter as outlined by the Court in itfs
Ruling is void of the inputs of the Plaintiff that point to the
coercion used against him. The Court has been consistently blind
and deaf to the inputs of the Plaintiff. The Court allowed the
proceedings to continue with the Defendant (the idler) with over a
$2,400/month rent-free income and granted the Plaintiff (the
worker) $900/month. This set up the Plaintiff with the most
expensive wheel-spinning counsel available and forced the Plaintiff
to fire his counsel for obvious economic reasons. When the
Plaintiff brought this matter before the Court the response of this
Court of inequity was that "the Plaintiff needs more incentive to
settle". The Court denied the benign request that the divorce take
place and then a property settlement trial take place on Dec. 2.
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This would have given the Plaintiff access to the funds of his
present wife, and defeated the whole purpose of the Court to force
the Plaintiff to sign over his share of property by coercion and to
keep him from proper counsel.
In the matter of the income from the investments stolen by the
Defendant from frozen accounts and the income from the Four-Plex,
the Plaintiff was promised by the Court over and over again that
there would be an accounting. It was pointed out to the Plaintiff
that all of these funds would be accounted for. That would cause a
hardship on the counsel for the Defendant. It is clear that the
Court had no intention of ever having any form of accounting. An
accounting would reveal the atrocity of this inequitable
settlement, and would clearly show the Plaintiff has been coerced
into signing all documents. The Court seems think the number of
various documents signed, or statements sworn to, in this matter
verifies that no coercion was present. The meat grinder of coercion
was set up by the Court through the unwarranted garnishment of the
Plaintiff's wages for les that $10/month more than was being paid
by the plaintiff. The Court in it's criminal bias, allowed a
unwarranted garnishment to occur that was against the law. The
Court, in it's bias, would have the Plaintiff pay half of his take
home pay to a Professional teacher, his exact counter part, unheard
of in any court of law. Fortunately the law would not allow this
unprecedented atrocity to take place. The signing of this document
allowing this atrocity was obtained by the lie "that one $900/month
payment would make the Plaintiff a free man11. To be free from the
3

theft, greed and Satanic hate of his present wife, for a mere $900
was at the time a bargain the Plaintiff could not pass by.
The truth of the matter was that this was the divorce decree. This
meat grinder was to be in place until the Plaintiff signed over
everything. There was no trial set, nor was any trial contemplated,
that was another lie just like the lie of accountability.
The Court has chosen in it's ruling not to put any estimated
value on the division of property. The Four-Plex has been shown to
be worth half of the estate. At this time the equity is about
$51,000 and going up at $10, 000/year. With the mortgage on the home
paid the equity there is about $40,000. The Defendant has over
$30,000 in her personal undeclared estate $15,000 of which was
obtained in family investments and labeled "inherited" by the
Defendant with no accountability required by the Court. With
another $11,000 from pager leases and about that amount saved
during the litigation as ordered by the Court, half of the workers
retirement ($65,000) the idler has a settlement of about $197,000.
The Plaintiff was required to give up his savings at the Key of
$14,000 and give that money to the idler living him with a $10,000
investment with Boston $2,400 in bonds and $1,800 in bioteck stock.
This is a total of $14,200 as opposed to $197,000. Note that the
defendants half of the voice-mail and pager lease was not included
since it is clear the Court has no intention of forcing that
payment or correcting the amount of that payment as per the
divorce.
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This Court would have the world believe that this atrocity was
obtained without coercion. If there was no coercion, and if the
Plaintiff had been represented with proper counsel, the above claim
in and of itself would warrant a trial. Since the Court has shown
to have unparalleled bias in this matter the Plaintiff requests a
trial by a jury of his peers as his God given constitutional right.
The founding fathers put that right in the constitution to guard
against the very atrocity show above.
Dated this the 17th day of December 1992.

Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
Box 435
Springville, Utah 84663
*&"**
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519 or 489-7490
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff

MOTION
TO
CORRECT
AND
AMEND
THE
DECREE OF DIVORCE
TO CONFORM TO THE
LAW
COMMISSIONER MAETANI
Civil No. 924400839

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant

1.

Whereas the Plaintiff, having been denied his constitutional

rights, to counsel, to a trial, and access to his estate via the
Court's unprecedented bias, requests, that the Court consider the
aspects of a long-needless-public appeal during 1993 and order the
following amendments to the Decree of Divorce be granted to conform
this Divorce, to the laws of divorce in the State of Utah.
a.

That the four-plex in question should be sold by the

Accountant Sidney Gilbert (the Defendants choice) and that the
the Court order him to evaluate the estate and to grant to the
Plaintiff his half of the estate in cash from the said sale, and to
the Defendant her half of the estate.
b.

That all bank accounts holding family investments or

income, regardless of the name or names on the accounts, such as
the $700/ voice mail system lease, the three $97.50/month leases,
the income from the four-plex and the total income thereof and of
all investments, be split

from January 1,1992 to the expiration

of the said leases as per the Laws of the State of Utah (50/50).

EXHIBIT 4

c.

That the home in question be granted to the Defendant,

and that the equity therein be counted as part of her half of the
estate.
2.

The Plaintiff requests that, paragraphs 25 through 31 be

stricken from the Stipulation and the like paragraphs from the
Decree of Divorce. These paragraphs were written by Marilyn Brown
to cover her illegal and criminal actions, as an officer of the
Court, and to hide the fact that she was told twice by the
Plaintiff that he was being coerced into signing these documents.
She knew the Plaintiff had no access to money to hire counsel, and
she knew that none would be consulted because she had arranged this
to be the case, via her complete control of the Court, and the bias
of the Court. These paragraphs constitute lies and entrapment and
are not statements pertinent to any divorce. Defendant did not have
counsel and has testified that he was coerced into signing both the
Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce.
3.

The Court denied the request of the Plaintiff to grant a

divorce and then have a property settlement trial, because in the
Court's own words, the Plaintiff needed more "incentive". It was
the Courts position that if the Plaintiff married prior to the
trial, his wife may have had access to money to hire counsel.
Therefor, to insure there would be no counsel for the Plaintiff at
the Dec. 2, 1992 trial date, the Court refused this benign request.
There can't be any other reason for the denial since the economic
hardship was pointed out in the garnishment hearing. As usual, the
Court was deaf, and blind to any request by a person acting pro se.
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4.

At that time the Plaintiff was ordered by this Court to pay

the idler, half of his wages, which violates the Law, but this
Court of inequity never has considered the law, nor the fact that
no other court can be found that, has taken alimony from the wages
of one Professional Teacher and given it to another Professional
Teacher. That sort of thing requires a tweedy bird in charge.
Meanwhile the Defendant(the idler) was to enjoy her $3,000/ month
of the workers past efforts. It was the Courts feeling that the
idler should not get out of practice after 32 years, and that she
should be able to squirrel away $2,000 a month for seven months or
ten years, or as long as it took to get the Plaintiff to sign away
his property, ($14,000 never to be accounted for) , this Court
requires no accounting for clients of Marilyn Brown (the Courts
little tweedy bird). The $7,000 stolen from the estate from the
Alpine Credit Union joint account by Virginia Topham was not
considered by the Court since tweedy bird said it was taken prior
to a date, set by tweedy bird.
5.

The incredible bias of this Court would have the world believe

that, Robert H. Peterson, a Professor that teaches calculus, gave
Virginia Topham the four-plex (half of the estate), the home
($41,000 equity) her estate (about $32,000) half of his retirement
($65,000) and then turned over to this thief, of thirty two years,
another $14,000 from his personal savings account, leaving him with
next to nothing after his debts are paid, and did this knowing that
the law allows him half of the estate, all without coercion. For
this Court then to say there was "no evidence of coercion" requires
a blindness unparalleled in the history of inequity.
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4.

The Court is trying to justify this atrocity by any means. The

thinking of the Court that the Plaintiff at one time gave all of
his life's work to the idler, and the thief of the marriage and
thought that was fair, and then changed his mind is one of the
straws the Court is grasping for. This according to this Court of
bias would constitute a reason to let this atrocity stand as is. If
the Court were correct and no coercion took place, consider the
fact that the Plaintiff had no counsel and received 10% and the
idler 90% of the estate via the most expensive wheel-spinning-lying
-intimidating-coercive counsel available. It would be the duty and
the obligation of the Court to make this right. The purpose of
having courts in the land is to address inequity and to provide a
nonviolent method of settling differences. It is very clear to the
Plaintiff, why the divorce courts are filled with violence. The
coercive meat grinder I have been through via the gross inequity of
this Court would have brought many men to violence.
5.

The position the Court has taken in this case is: a; the

total of the estate would be under the complete control of tweedy
birds client, to include all income, and all real estate, and all
bank accounts and the Plaintiff should have no access to any of his
accounts, b; to take half of the workers wages for the idler
($3,000/month income), c; to denie the Plaintiff all of his basic
constitutional rights (hearing, trial and counsel), d; to refuse
any accounting of income or assets of tweedy birds client and to
continuously lie to the Plaintiff saying that an accounting would
be made, e; to be a party to coercion via the rubber stamping of
4

any request made by tweedy bird, f; the worker was denied a place
to live when by law he owns half of a four-plex because tweedy bird
didn f t want the Plaintiff to have the same living accommodations as
the Defendant, that would have defeated the purpose of the meat
grinder of coercion, ordered by tweedy bird and this Court- The
Plaintiff was to camp out the rest of his life, if it took that
long for the coercion to take effect.
6.

Any one of the above, constitute a good and sufficient reason

to grant the Plaintiff a trial and a change of venue without the
question of coercion being considered. This Court can save a great
deal of time and money for both parties by simply conforming to the
Law and dividing this estate in half as prescribed by the LAW.
Dated this the 1st day of January 1993.

bbert H. "Peter^rin

<£^^^

Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
Box 435
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ex 550
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff

VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant

1.

:
:
:

OBJECTION
TO
THE
ORDER AND REQUEST
FOR A HEARING

:
:

JUDGE HARDING
Civil No, 924400839

The Plaintiff objects to the Order submitted by Marilyn

Brown for and in behalf of the Defendant since the Court has not
granted the Plaintiff his constitutional right to a hearing, or any
other constitutional right for that matter• The Courts position
that, at some place, in some mood, at some time, the Plaintiff ,
without coercion, granted to the woman that has stolen from the
marriage for 32 years, 92 % of the estate in question is absurd.
Certainly if the Courts position were accurate, this would point
out the need for counsel for the Plaintiff and it would be the
Courts duty and sacred obligation, to order a trial and order that
his half of the estate be released to him, according to the LAW,
for the purpose of obtaining counsel. There is only one thing that
stops this from happening and that is the bias of the Court. This
Court refuses to consider the right of the Plaintiff to counsel and
to a trial. The Court's order that the workers income should be
$900/month and the idlers income should be $2,500/month ($2,000
squirreling money) and that she should have total control of both

estates is a criminal act on the part of this Court that clearly
disqualifies this Court from further adjudication. The Plaintiff
has objected to this atrocity over and over again. At each of these
objections the Court has lied to the Plaintiff over and over again
concerning accountability of the income from the four-plex and the
investments. It is clear this Court does not require accountability
for clients of Marilyn Brown. Accounting would reveal too much.
2.

The Court also refuses to consider an Order To Show Cause

why the Defendant continues to steal the income from the pager and
voice mail system assigned to the Plaintiff, by Marilyn Brown, the
one that runs this Court. It appears Marilyn Brown has decided not
to pay this since the Court will not hold a hearing or allow the
Plaintiff access to any of his estate. She directed her client to
steal $7,000 from a joint account and close two others that were
frozen by the Court and got away with that theft, so why not
continue to steal? The Court will hear nothing or see nothing
submitted by the Plaintiff because he is acting pro-se. For the
Court to allow access to his estate would certainly mean he would
get counsel which this Court has refused the Plaintiff for the past
nine months. It is clear the Court has a bias for Marilyn Brown and
against Robert H. Peterson since he is acting pro-se since every
single proposal submitted by Marilyn Brown has been rubber stamped
and every submission made by the Plaintiff has been denied no
matter how benign that petition might be. The Court would like to
cover up the crime committed by Marilyn Brown by coercing and lying
to the Plaintiff to obtain his signature. Members of the Bar take
2

care of their own. The Court has not granted a hearing since this
would enable the Plaintiff to put Marilyn Brown under oath and have
her testify that she continued this atrocious crime after having
been told twice by the Plaintiff that he was being coerced.
2.

At a hearing expert witnesses could be called in that

would testify that the Plaintiff was coerced into signing away his
half of the estate. The Court is not qualified to read the mind of
the Plaintiff nor to pass any type of judgement concerning whether
the Plaintiff was or was not coerced. However, there is no evidence
that the Plaintiff was not coerced and a preponderance of evidence
that he was coerced. Clearly 92% versus 8% is evidence of coercion
to anyone that is not deaf and blind to the facts.
3.

There is no question that the Plaintiff was lied to. The

clear evidence that he was lied to is in the Divorce Decree. The
Decree states that each party was to pay their own attorney costs
and in another place that Marilyn Brown should receive $1,000 from
the Plaintiff's personal savings account. These small print
additions, from one bargaining session to another, is standard
procedure for Marilyn Brown. This is how the Plaintiff is to have
something less than half of the Voice Mail lease. Half of this
lease is $700/2 or $350.
Dated this day the 26 th day of January 1993.
Robert H. Peterson

Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
Box 437
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff
VS.
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant

:
:
:
:
:
:

REQUEST FOR A HEARING
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC
RELATIONS ORDER
COMMISSIONER MAETANI
Civil No, 924400839

STATE OF UTAH

)
:ss
COUNTY OF UTAH )
Whereas the Plaintiff has been denied his basic constitutional
rights, the right to an attorney, the right to a trial and the
right to a hearing, the Plaintiff requests that this order be set
aside so that an appeal can be made to the State Supreme Court. The
Plaintiff requests a hearing to consider this matter.
Whereas the Plaintiff has been coerced into signing the
Divorce Decree by a conspiracy of this Court namely, Commissioner
Maetani and counsel for the Defendant Ms. Brown, the Plaintiff
therefore requests a property settlement trial and a Change of
Venue.
This conspiracy is as follows;
1. The Court first stripes the opponent of all assets. The
Bank accounts in the opponents name are frozen, the accounts in Ms.
Browns clients name are not frozen. All joint accounts are frozen
after Ms. Browns client has removed all of the assets of those

EXHIBIT 6

accounts. If she is caught taking money from frozen accounts that
crime is not recognized by the Court as the crime of theft but is
given the Courts okey. All investment income is directed to Ms.
Browns client to be placed in secret accounts not frozen by the
Court. All accumulated moneys from investments in accounts are
given to Ms. Browns client. In my case a total of $41,000. All real
estate together with all the income from that real estate is then
granted Ms. Browns client (house $40,000, four-plex $60,000). These
are all unlawful acts but the conspirators are ready for the
objections by the opponent. They plot together what will happen in
court. It goes like this; Ms. Brown stands up and tells the court
what the issues are; what should be said by each person and what
the Courts disposition shall be. She sits down and the rest is like
water off a ducks back. She writes that disposition up and it is
quickly signed. Never at any is there an opportunity for the
opponent to have his say. We simply go through the motions of
having court. This generates all kinds of records that favor the
right client in case of a question. The Court then tells the
opponent he has nothing to worry about since there will be an
accounting of the money stolen from the bank accounts ($7,000 in my
case), the money stolen from the investments and all of the real
estate is in good hands. The second lie is like the first. That is
that "this is just temporary". These lies are designed to make the
opponent thing he will end up with his half of the estate (BY THE
LAWS OF THE STATE OF UTAH) if he just keeps his mouth shut and
stops objecting to this type of treatment.
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2.

The conspiracy then moves to the opponents income. Half

of the take home pay is garnisheed. This is against the law but
who's paying any attention to the divorce laws? The law states that
only 25% can be taken. The object here is not to get more money
since $30,000 is quit enough, but to keep the opponent from his
assets and his income so that he will have no possibility of having
counsel. This criminal act was done with $30,000 in cash of the
family investments available to Ms. Browns client. This action
insures the conspirators that the opponent will not have counsel
and can be told any number of lies. It also assures that the estate
will become that of the clients since at $2,500 a month with no
mortgage payment for the idler, and $900 a month for the worker
with a mortgage payment and his own housing costs to pay, the
client can steal $2,000 a month away in secrete accounts. Money
stolen from the marriage over the years is labeled "inherited" and
thus Ms. Browns client never reveals her estate or her retirement
so that she can take half of the opponents.
3.

The third technique is very simple just spin wheels. The

Court is just to busy to have a trial. But if the opponent wants a
divorce and a property settlement at a later date he is told that
would cause him to loose his "incentive" to settle. Settle means to
hand everything over. The opponent has his choice he can give the
conspirators his estate at $2,000/month with the wheel spinning
techniques of Ms. Brown or sign it all over at one time. I lasted
seven months. My health and my ability to perform my work were at
risk. It was clear this conspiracy would not allow a fair trial so
3

the only hope to have my constitutional rights restored was through
the appeals court.
This criminal conspiracy was more than I could handle. When
Ms.Brown said she would give me my income back if I would sign over
the estate and she would allow money to pay my doctor bills
and debts, that appeared to be my opportunity to break the
conspiracy. By selling my truck I am now debt free with
no valuable assets of any kind. This was seen by me at the time as
a means of escape from the criminal conspiracy that worked so well
to circumvent the divorce laws of the state of Utah.
In this conspiracy it does not matter what is written in the
Divorce Decree. Self contradiction is okey. You can say in one
place each party shall pay his or her own attorneys fees and in
another the opponent is to pay Ms. Brown $1,000. You can lie about
the the opponents consultation with an attorney

and you can lie

about the coercion of the opponent, and the Court will not
recognize those lies and set the matter for trial as he is required
to do by the law.
Only those parts that involve getting money from the opponent
are recognized by the conspirators. In my case I was awarded half
of the lease for the pagers and the voice mail system. That is $700
(voice mail lease) plus $195(pager lease) plus $97.5(pager lease)
or 992.5/2 = $496.25/ month beginning Oct. 10, 1992. At this
writing there is $2,977.50 stolen by the Defendant from the
Plaintiff for the past six months. This and the tidbit about paying
your own attorney's fees were put in the Divorce Decree to get the
Plaintiff's signature.
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There never was any intention to abide by this since the
conspiracy is in tact. It will certainly be interesting to see what
razzel-dazzle-legal-smeagle the conspirators come up with to
circumvent the responsibility for this theft. However the QUEEN OF
LIARS AND THE MASTER OF COERCION will certainly have something that
sounds legitimate. Please donft use the lfitfs okey to steal before
a certain date set by me, routine11 thatfs getting old.
Signed this day the 22nd day of March 19S3.

Robert H. Peterson Plaintiff
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Robert H. Peterson acting pro se
1373 East 400 South,
Springville, Utah 84663
Telephone: (801) 222-8000 ext.550 or 519
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH DISTRICT
IN AND FOR UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ROBERT H. PETERSON
Plaintiff
vs.
VIRGINIA T. PETERSON
Defendant

1.

:
:
:
:
:

REQUEST FOR A HEARING
QUALIFIED DOMESTIC
RELATIONS ORDER
COMMISSIONER MAETANI
Civil No. 924400839

Whereas the Plaintiff has been denied his basic constitutional

rights, the right to an attorney, the right to a trial and the
right to a hearing, the Plaintiff requests that this order be set
aside so that an appeal can be made to the State Supreme Court. The
Plaintiff requests a hearing to consider this matter.
2.

Whereas the Plaintiff has been coerced into signing the

Divorce Decree by a conspiracy of this Court namely, Commissioner
Maetani and counsel for the Defendant Ms. Brown, the Plaintiff
therefore requests a property settlement trial and a Change of
Venue.
3.

Whereas the Defendants latest fraud is the matter of a $3,500

tax deduction. The QUEEN OF LIARS has written in her perverted
Divorce Decree, that she would pay the two years of back payments
due on the home in question, with part of the $14,000 in cash given
to her by the Plaintiff from his personal savings account on the
day before her perverted Divorce Decree was signed. However, since
the conspiracy is in tact she decided not to pay that until 1993.
1

By so doing the QUEEN OF LIARS could save her client $3#500 on next
years taxes. All of the other thefts committed by the QUEEN OF
LIARS have been overlooked by this Court so why not one more for
the road? This would also give the QUEEN OF LIARS and her client
the mortgage payments for October, November and December. Since no
accounting is required for the Queen's client this $1,600 might
just as well be added to the theft for a grand total of $5,100.
4.

In addition to the above theft of $5,100 there is the matter

of the pager/voice mail system lease income. Half of this was to be
paid to the Plaintiff beginning Nov. 10 and is now seven months in
the rears. The amount outstanding is now $ 3,473.75 for a total of
$8,573.75 owed to the Plaintiff as stipulated in the QUEEN OF LIARS
perverted Stipulation. She of course never had any intention of
paying these amounts or abiding by the perverted Stipulation she
wrote. Those items were put in there to get my signature by fraud
and coercion.
5.

The Courts refusal to grant a hearing is understandable since

the Court knows that expert witnesses would be available at that
hearing to testify that my signature was obtained by coercion and
that the QUEEN OF LIARS was told twice that I was being coerced.
The Courts refusal to grant a hearing and the Courts refusal to
hear the testimony of the expert witnesses verifies the
conspiracy. This clearly constitutes malfeasance of office.
It is malfeasance of office to sign the pack of lies having no
accountability, created by the QUEEN OF LIARS.
Dated this day the 3rd day ofJCtfay 1993.

(KJ^
Robert H.Peterson (Plaintiff)

